Message Number: 737
From: "Franz Marschall" <marschall Æ solartekt.de>
Date: Sun, 2 Sep 2007 13:58:52 +0200
Subject: Re: mind the gap
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Great text!
This puts a completly new view to the subject. If the research data is real , I
am convinced that too much inequality is bad for all. What can be  more
important than having a long and healthy live. The problem seems to  be the
proper balance. In Cuba, the health situation seems to be fairly  good. But how
important is the happiness?

Franz, 
the darwinistic environmentalist
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Michelle Sternthal 
  To: Daniel Reeves 
  Cc: James W Mickens ; Dave Morris ; improvetheworld Æ umich.edu ; Steven
Reeves	; reeves-hayos Æ umich.edu ; reeves-kalkman Æ umich.edu 
  Sent: Saturday, September 01, 2007 4:11 PM
  Subject: Re: mind the gap


  I have remained silent for too long!	I have to admit, that as a  
  sociologist,	the notion that income inequality is good for society  
  is anathema to our discipline (which is probably one reason  
  sociologists and economists have a noted rivalry).

  But putting intellectual/philosophical disagreements aside, from a  
  purely rhetorical/debate perspective, I have been somewhat frustrated   
  by the notable absence of empirical evidence used to back up the  
  arguments that income equality is good for society or at least  
  "fair."   Since we are loyal positivists who embrace the scientific  
  method,  allow me to introduce some research on the matter.

  Since my area of interest, forgive me if I focus on the health  
  effects of income inequality.  A question which has preoccupied  
  health researchers/sociologists, and even health economists is  
  whether, indeed, the growing gap between the rich and poor is good  
  for a society's health (let's use mortality, a nice objective  
  indicator.  Dying young is less good than dying old, all else being  
  equal).

  There are reasons to believe that income inequality hurts everyone,  
  even those not on the bottom.  Let's assume two states have the same	
  average income-- $50,000.  In one state, the distribution is pretty  
  wide, so there are people really poor and people really rich; in  
  another, the distribution hovers around the $50,000 mark.  Which  
  state would we want to live in, from a health perspective at least?	
  Research suggests that it would SUCK to live in the first for a  
  couple of reasons.  First off, in an unequal society, you are much  
  more likely to be in the bottom than on the top, and being poor is a	
  well-established cause of bad health.    Second, David Marmot, an  
  epidemiologist, has argued that simply being in a stratified society	
  can harm health.  A twenty-five-year follow-up from the Whitehall  
  study found that the higher the position in the occupational	
  hierarchy in Britain, the lower the mortality rate from all causes,  
  from coronary heart disease, and from a range of diseases not related   
  to smoking  Note that NONE of  these men was poor in any usual sense	
  of that word. They were all in stable, office-based employment in and   
  around Whitehall, London.  (Marmot, "Inequalities in Health," New  
  England Journal of Medicine (12 July 2001): 134 136).  Here, relative   
  income deprivation mattered more than absolute.

  But even beyond that, it seems that a society with large income  
  inequality  hurts those at the top.  One of the more famous studies,	
  by George Kaplan of U. of Michigan and colleagues (1996) examined  
  income inequality among the 50 states.  Kaplan et al. showed that  
  that income share held by the least well-off 50 percent of the  
  population in each state was strongly correlated with the state's  
  mortality in 1990 (r=3D-.62, p  I have to respond to your yootles critique
first!
  >  Our aim is both to decrease to next to nothing the overhead of  
  > applying more formal mechanisms to decision-making (and more  
  > recently, prediction and prediction+decisions) as well as convince	
  > you there's plenty to be gained.  Bethany and I yootle every day  
  > for every little (and big) thing imaginable.  (Being both  
  > indecisive types it often saves us a ton of time.) Granted, we're  
  > gigantic dorks and no one else cares yet.
  >
  > I'm of course not done defending my boyfriend Paul either.	More on   
  > that later.
  >
  > But I'm actually delighted that we're making real progress on  
  > circumscribing the disagreement while identifying common ground  
  > (eg, Graham is at least right in some other fantasy universe;  
  > Trixie won't like that concession at all!  and of course I conceded   
  > on slavery and may do so on health care, where basic human rights  
  > are at stake.. although Kevin may set you straight on the  
  > healthcare issue!).
  >
  >
  > --- \/   FROM James W Mickens AT 07.08.31 22:21 (Yesterday)   \/ ---
  >
  >>> You're characterizing our disagreement as hinging on whether public 
  >>> policy should optimize economics subject to moral constraints or
  >>> optimize morality subject to economic constraints.  I'm unclear  
  >>> on what
  >>> either of those really mean for public policy.
  >>
  >>
  >> There's a difference in the intent of your policy and the methods	
  >> that you will use to evaluate it. For example, suppose that you've   
  >> devised a new tax code for an underdeveloped country. When you  
  >> evaluate its success, will you look at how much additional wealth	
  >> it generated, or some actual measure of utility such as the  
  >> percentage of citizens who have access to electricity or clean  
  >> water? I use the term "actual measure of utility" because I think	
  >> that just examining, say, the increase in GDP is a bad way to  
  >> measure net social welfare. The net wealth of a society is, at  
  >> best, an indirect measure of its net welfare because aggregate  
  >> wealth trends tell us nothing about the *distribution* of wealth  
  >> or whether that wealth is being used to satisfy some particular  
  >> goal. The classic example is health care. Despite rising levels of   
  >> aggregate wealth in America, many *individual* Americans have poor   
  >> health and inadequate access to proper medical care. Is the  
  >> solution to this problem the creation of even more wealth in the  
  >> hope that the health care industry will spontaneously reorganize?	
  >> Or is the solution a targeted policy, whether it be nationalized  
  >> health care, better health education in schools, and/or something	
  >> else? I argue that the latter approach would be better,  
  >> particularly since the market has thus far been ineffective in  
  >> addressing this issue.
  >>
  >> The failure of wealth-driven policies is even more obvious in the	
  >> international pharmaceutical market, where drug companies develop	
  >> medicines for diseases that affluent people care about (e.g.,  
  >> restless leg syndrome, diabetes) and ignore a huge number of  
  >> illnesses (e.g., diarrheal diseases) that affect a much larger  
  >> number of people who have much less money. People who care about  
  >> net welfare should find this problematic. So, in the international   
  >> drug market, should we pursue wealth-driven or morality-driven  
  >> policies? In other words, should we allow drug companies to  
  >> maximize their profits and hope that they'll turn a charitable eye   
  >> towards the developing world, or should we force them through  
  >> regulation, subsidies, tax credits, etc., to address the needs of	
  >> poorer countries? History suggests that the former strategy will  
  >> fail if you're trying to optimize for health and not profit.
  >>
  >> I understand that it is extremely expensive to develop new drugs  
  >> and that pharmaceutical companies must be given a way to recoup  
  >> these costs. However, it's obvious that a market system which  
  >> focuses on maximizing their profits will not lead to a net  
  >> increase in global health (an important utility metric).
  >>
  >>
  >>
  >>> Let me first defend Graham's point.  He concedes whole classes of   
  >>> exceptions and I think social injustices are included, if not  
  >>> explicitly. His argument -- that income inequality is not,  
  >>> inherently, unjust -- remains intact.
  >>
  >> Once again, I'm claiming that economic justness does not equal  
  >> moral justness. When you say that income inequality is "not  
  >> inherently unjust," you should specify whether you refer to the  
  >> economic definition, the moral definition, or both.
  >>
  >> If Graham includes social injustice in his exceptions list, then I   
  >> suppose that he and I are in agreement. But if Graham believes in	
  >> the entrenched, pervasive nature of social injustice, why does he	
  >> spend so much time waxing poetic about the inherent fairness of  
  >> economic inequality? This fairness only exists in an idealized  
  >> model of the economy which bears little resemblance to the real  
  >> one. The fact that Graham spends most of his time talking about  
  >> this idealized world suggests that either a) he is a hopeless  
  >> utopian, or b) he does not, in fact, believe that social injustice   
  >> is entrenched and pervasive ;-).
  >>
  >> ~j
  >>
  >>
  >> p.s.
  >>
  >>> And just to nip a potential subthread: the non-mathematically  
  >>> inclined are not allowed to blithely declare human motivation to	
  >>> be irreducible to mathematics.
  >>
  >> Ah, but I claim that the mathematically inclined are not allowed  
  >> to blithely declare that human motivation *is* reducible to  
  >> mathematics ;-). The reason that I do not use yootles to determine   
  >> who will pick me up from the airport is that, in the common case,	
  >> this decision is not subject to rigorous mathematical or economic	
  >> constraints, nor should it be. In many scenarios, I only care  
  >> about approximate notions of fairness. I suppose that if gasoline	
  >> were $27,000 a gallon, it might be reasonable to employ a strong  
  >> mathematical framework to prevent tragedy (e.g., "Oh no, Todd has	
  >> taken me to the airport fifteen times but I haven't taken him at  
  >> all. Todd has now spent $405,000 on gas while I have escaped scot- 
  >> free."). Absent such extreme conditions, the introduction of  
  >> mathematics into simple human transactions will often just add  
  >> overhead and produce little tangible benefit.
  >>
  >> It is frequently possible and fruitful to analyze people's  
  >> behavior using mathematical models. However, that doesn't mean  
  >> that the underlying psychology of the individual is actually  
  >> driven by these models, or that giving the math to people will  
  >> make it easier for them to manage their lives.
  >>
  >
  > -- 
  > http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/dreeves  - -  search://"Daniel Reeves "
  >
  > Dilbert:	 "...and we'll buy a dozen of these. We're trying to
  >		 spend our budget so it doesn't get cut next year."
  > Salesperson: "This is great! You guys are so dumb that I don't even
  >		 have to use my fake personality to make the sale!"
  >
  >
  >


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  Great text!  
  This puts a completly new view to the subject . If 
the research data is real, I am convinced that too much inequality is bad  for 
all. What can be more important than having a long and healthy live. The
problem  
seems to be the proper balance. In Cuba, the health situation seems to be 
fairly 
good. But how important is the happiness?  
     
  Franz,   
  the darwinistic environmentalist   
 
   ----- Original Message -----  
    From:  
   Michelle Sternthal	
   
    To:   Daniel Reeves   
    Cc:   James W Mickens  ;  Dave Morris   ;  improvetheworld Æ umich.edu
  ;  Steven Reeves   ;	reeves-hayos Æ umich.edu  ;  reeves-kalkman Æ
umich.edu    
    Sent:  Saturday, September 01,  07 4:11 
  PM 
    Subject:  Re: mind the gap 
     I have remained silent for too long!  I have to admit , 
  that as a   sociologist,  the notion that income inequality  is 
  good for society   is anathema to our discipline (which is probably  
  one reason   sociologists and economists have a noted 
  rivalry).  But putting intellectual/philosophical disagreements aside , 
  from a   purely rhetorical/debate perspective, I have been somewhat  
  frustrated   by the notable absence of empirical evidence used to  back 
  up the   arguments that income equality is good for society or at  
  least   "fair."   Since we are loyal positivists who embrace	
  the scientific   method,  allow me to introduce some research  on 
  the matter.  Since my area of interest, forgive me if I focus on the	
  health   effects of income inequality.  A question which has	
  preoccupied	health researchers/sociologists, and even health  
  economists is   whether, indeed, the growing gap between the rich  and 
  poor is good	 for a society's health (let's use mortality, a nice  
  objective   indicator.  Dying young is less good than dying  old, 
  all else being   equal).  There are reasons to believe that  
  income inequality hurts everyone,   even those not on the 
  bottom.  Let's assume two states have the same   average income -- 
  $50,000.  In one state, the distribution is pretty	wide, so 
  there are people really poor and people really rich; in    another, the 
  distribution hovers around the $50,000 mark.	Which	 state would 
  we want to live in, from a health perspective at least?   
   Research suggests that it would SUCK to live in the first for a   
   couple of reasons.  First off, in an unequal society, you are  
  much	 more likely to be in the bottom than on the top, and being  poor 
  is a	 well-established cause of bad health.	  Second , 
  David Marmot, an   epidemiologist, has argued that simply being  in a 
  stratified society   can harm health.  A twenty-five-year  
  follow-up from the Whitehall	 study found that the higher the  
  position in the occupational	 hierarchy in Britain, the lower the  
  mortality rate from all causes,   from coronary heart disease, and  
  from a range of diseases not related	 to smoking  Note that	NONE 
  of  these men was poor in any usual sense   of that word. They  
  were all in stable, office-based employment in and   around Whitehall , 
  London.  (Marmot, "Inequalities in Health," New   England Journal  
  of Medicine (12 July 2001): 134 136).  Here, relative    income 
  deprivation mattered more than absolute.  But even beyond that, it  seems 
  that a society with large income   inequality  hurts those  at the 
  top.	One of the more famous studies,   by George Kaplan of  U. of 
  Michigan and colleagues (1996) examined   income inequality among  the 
  50 states.  Kaplan et al. showed that   that income share held  by 
  the least well-off 50 percent of the	 population in each state  was 
  strongly correlated with the state's	 mortality in 1990  (r=3D-.62, 
  p<.0001), and that this association was   not affected by median  
  state income, was consistent across age   groups, and ALL income  
  brackets.   Moreover, areas with high income	  inequality 
  have not only high mortality but high crime rates,	especially of 
  homicide.  Such factors can affect everyone, not just    the 
  poorest ( M. Wilson and M. Daly, "Life Expectancy, Economic  
   Inequality, Homicide, and Reproductive Timing in Chicago  
   Neighbourhoods," British Medical Journal (26 April 1997):  71 1274). 
  T  But even assuming that the "utility" gained in terms of health  
  for	rich people was unaffected by the distribution of income , it 
  may	still make "economic" sense to have a less unequal 
  society.  It may   be more efficient and maximizing everyone 's 
  utility.   Angus Deaton,   a British health economist , has 
  shown that there is a nonlinear   increase in probability of dying  
  with decreasing income (Deaton,   "Health Inequality and Economic  
  Development",Working paper, Princeton   University Research Program  in 
  Development Studies and Center for   Health and Wellbeing, 
  2001).  Meaning, that if, at low levels of GNP,   a small  
  increase corresponds to a large increase in longevity, then	 taking 
  some money from rich people will have less effect on their	mortality 
  than giving the same money to the poor will affect theirs.  
   Therefore, other things being equal, a population with more	
   egalitarian distribution of income will have better health than   
   another with the same average income but greater income 
  inequality.	Here are some other articles attached for more 
  discussion on the matter.  --Michelle  
   
   

     > I have to respond to your yootles critique 
  first! >  Our aim is both to decrease to next to nothing the  
  overhead of	> applying more formal mechanisms to decision -making 
  (and more   > recently, prediction and prediction +decisions) as 
  well as convince   > you there's plenty to be gained.  Bethany  
  and I yootle every day   > for every little (and big) thing  
  imaginable.  (Being both   > indecisive types it often saves  
  us a ton of time.) Granted, we're   > gigantic dorks and no one  
  else cares yet. > > I'm of course not done defending my boyfriend  
  Paul either.	More on   > that later. > > But  I'm 
  actually delighted that we're making real progress on   > 
  circumscribing the disagreement while identifying common ground    > 
  (eg, Graham is at least right in some other fantasy universe;    > 
  Trixie won't like that concession at all!  and of course I conceded	
   > on slavery and may do so on health care, where basic human 
  rights   > are at stake.. although Kevin may set you straight  on 
  the	> healthcare issue!). > > > --- 
  \/   FROM James W Mickens AT 07.08.31 22:21  (Yesterday)   
  \/ --- > >>> You're characterizing our disagreement as  
  hinging on whether public >>> policy should optimize economics  
  subject to moral constraints or >>> optimize morality subject  to 
  economic constraints.  I'm unclear   >>> on 
  what >>> either of those really mean for public 
  policy. >> >> >> There's a difference in the  intent 
  of your policy and the methods   >> that you will use to  
  evaluate it. For example, suppose that you've   >> devised  a new 
  tax code for an underdeveloped country. When you   >> evaluate	
  its success, will you look at how much additional wealth    >> it 
  generated, or some actual measure of utility such as the    >> 
  percentage of citizens who have access to electricity or clean  
   >> water? I use the term "actual measure of utility" because I  
  think   >> that just examining, say, the increase in GDP is  a 
  bad way to   >> measure net social welfare. The net wealth  of a 
  society is, at   >> best, an indirect measure of its net welfare  
  because aggregate   >> wealth trends tell us nothing about  the 
  *distribution* of wealth   >> or whether that wealth is being  
  used to satisfy some particular   >> goal. The classic example	
  is health care. Despite rising levels of   >> aggregate wealth	
  in America, many *individual* Americans have poor   >> health  
  and inadequate access to proper medical care. Is the	  >> 
  solution to this problem the creation of even more wealth in the   
   >> hope that the health care industry will spontaneously 
  reorganize?	>> Or is the solution a targeted policy, whether	
  it be nationalized   >> health care, better health education  in 
  schools, and/or something   >> else? I argue that the latter  
  approach would be better,   >> particularly since the market  has 
  thus far been ineffective in	 >> addressing this 
  issue. >> >> The failure of wealth-driven policies is  even 
  more obvious in the	>> international pharmaceutical market , 
  where drug companies develop	 >> medicines for diseases that  
  affluent people care about (e.g.,   >> restless leg syndrome , 
  diabetes) and ignore a huge number of   >> illnesses  (e.g., 
  diarrheal diseases) that affect a much larger   >> number  of 
  people who have much less money. People who care about    >> net 
  welfare should find this problematic. So, in the international  
   >> drug market, should we pursue wealth-driven or 
  morality-driven   >> policies? In other words, should we allow	
  drug companies to   >> maximize their profits and hope that  
  they'll turn a charitable eye   >> towards the developing  world, 
  or should we force them through   >> regulation, subsidies , tax 
  credits, etc., to address the needs of   >> poorer countries ? 
  History suggests that the former strategy will   >> fail if  
  you're trying to optimize for health and not profit . >> >> I 
  understand that it is extremely expensive to develop new drugs  
   >> and that pharmaceutical companies must be given a way to 
  recoup   >> these costs. However, it's obvious that a market  
  system which	 >> focuses on maximizing their profits will  not 
  lead to a net   >> increase in global health (an important  
  utility metric). >> >> >> >>> Let	me 
  first defend Graham's point.	He concedes whole classes of  
   >>> exceptions and I think social injustices are included , if 
  not	>>> explicitly. His argument -- that income inequality  
  is not,   >>> inherently, unjust -- remains 
  intact. >> >> Once again, I'm claiming that economic  
  justness does not equal   >> moral justness. When you say  that 
  income inequality is "not   >> inherently unjust," you should  
  specify whether you refer to the   >> economic definition , the 
  moral definition, or both. >> >> If Graham includes social  
  injustice in his exceptions list, then I   >> suppose that  he 
  and I are in agreement. But if Graham believes in   >> the  
  entrenched, pervasive nature of social injustice, why does he  
   >> spend so much time waxing poetic about the inherent fairness  
  of   >> economic inequality? This fairness only exists in  an 
  idealized   >> model of the economy which bears little 
  resemblance to the real   >> one. The fact that Graham spends  
  most of his time talking about   >> this idealized world  
  suggests that either a) he is a hopeless   >> utopian, or  b) he 
  does not, in fact, believe that social injustice   >> is  
  entrenched and pervasive ;-). >> >> 
  ~j >> >> >> p .s. >> >>> And 
  just to nip a potential subthread: the non-mathematically  
   >>> inclined are not allowed to blithely declare human motivation  
  to   >>> be irreducible to 
  mathematics. >> >> Ah, but I claim that the mathematically  
  inclined are not allowed   >> to blithely declare that human  
  motivation *is* reducible to	 >> mathematics ;-). The reason  
  that I do not use yootles to determine   >> who will pick  me up 
  from the airport is that, in the common case,   >> this decision  
  is not subject to rigorous mathematical or economic	>>  
  constraints, nor should it be. In many scenarios, I only care  
   >> about approximate notions of fairness. I suppose that if 
  gasoline   >> were $27,000 a gallon, it might be reasonable  to 
  employ a strong   >> mathematical framework to prevent tragedy	
  (e.g., "Oh no, Todd has   >> taken me to the airport fifteen  
  times but I haven't taken him at   >> all. Todd has now spent  
  $405,000 on gas while I have escaped scot-  >> free."). Absent	such 
  extreme conditions, the introduction of   >> mathematics into  
  simple human transactions will often just add   >> overhead  and 
  produce little tangible benefit. >> >> It is frequently  
  possible and fruitful to analyze people's   >> behavior using  
  mathematical models. However, that doesn't mean   >> that  the 
  underlying psychology of the individual is actually	>> driven  
  by these models, or that giving the math to people will    >> 
  make it easier for them to manage their lives . >> > > -- 
   >  http://ai.eecs.umich.edu /people/dreeves   
  - -  search://"Daniel Reeves" > > 
  Dilbert:     "...and we'll buy a dozen of these. We 're 
  trying 
  to  >	      ;   
  spend our budget so it doesn't get cut next year." > Salesperson : "This 
  is great! You guys are so dumb that I don't 
  even	>	        ;	
  have to use my fake personality to make the 
  sale!" > > >     

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