X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,HTML_MESSAGE autolearn=unavailable version=3.2.2 Sender: -2.6 (spamval) -- NONE Return-Path: Received: from newman.eecs.umich.edu (newman.eecs.umich.edu [141.213.4.11]) by boston.eecs.umich.edu (8.12.10/8.13.0) with ESMTP id l82CGHux027206 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL) for ; Sun, 2 Sep 2007 08:16:17 -0400 Received: from tadpole.mr.itd.umich.edu (mx.umich.edu [141.211.14.133]) by newman.eecs.umich.edu (8.14.1/8.14.1) with ESMTP id l82CFU54006351 for ; Sun, 2 Sep 2007 08:15:37 -0400 Received: FROM mailout09.sul.t-online.com (mailout09.sul.t-online.de [194.25.134.84]) BY tadpole.mr.itd.umich.edu ID 46DAA95D.38F83.1078 ; 2 Sep 2007 08:15:26 -0400 Received: from fwd28.aul.t-online.de by mailout09.sul.t-online.com with smtp id 1IRo6c-00057T-00; Sun, 02 Sep 2007 13:59:06 +0200 Received: from HUGOGO (ZquwyQZH8eq0cxGhpApinzXnkWLwNT8SCUwf6f5avnBsa9aeY32I0h Æ [84.134.219.182]) by fwd28.t-online.de with esmtp id 1IRo6T-0cyXnU0; Sun, 2 Sep 2007 13:58:57 +0200 Message-ID: <003d01c7ed58$a218aea0$0101a8c0 Æ HUGOGO> References:

MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_003A_01C7ED69.64FF4B30" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2900.3138 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3138 X-ID: ZquwyQZH8eq0cxGhpApinzXnkWLwNT8SCUwf6f5avnBsa9aeY32I0h X-TOI-MSGID: 7ccee8c4-3b98-4d7e-a1ca-e18ab04b0e1a X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.2.2 (2007-07-23) on newman.eecs.umich.edu X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV version 0.91.2, clamav-milter version 0.91.2 on newman.eecs.umich.edu X-Virus-Status: Clean Date: Sun, 2 Sep 2007 13:58:52 +0200 To: "Michelle Sternthal" , "Daniel Reeves" Cc: "James W Mickens" , "Dave Morris" , , "Steven Reeves" , , From: "Franz Marschall" Subject: Re: mind the gap This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_003A_01C7ED69.64FF4B30 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Great text! This puts a completly new view to the subject. If the research data is = real, I am convinced that too much inequality is bad for all. What can = be more important than having a long and healthy live. The problem seems = to be the proper balance. In Cuba, the health situation seems to be = fairly good. But how important is the happiness? Franz,=20 the darwinistic environmentalist ----- Original Message -----=20 From: Michelle Sternthal=20 To: Daniel Reeves=20 Cc: James W Mickens ; Dave Morris ; improvetheworld Æ umich.edu ; Steven = Reeves ; reeves-hayos Æ umich.edu ; reeves-kalkman Æ umich.edu=20 Sent: Saturday, September 01, 2007 4:11 PM Subject: Re: mind the gap I have remained silent for too long! I have to admit, that as a =20 sociologist, the notion that income inequality is good for society =20 is anathema to our discipline (which is probably one reason =20 sociologists and economists have a noted rivalry). But putting intellectual/philosophical disagreements aside, from a =20 purely rhetorical/debate perspective, I have been somewhat frustrated = by the notable absence of empirical evidence used to back up the =20 arguments that income equality is good for society or at least =20 "fair." Since we are loyal positivists who embrace the scientific =20 method, allow me to introduce some research on the matter. Since my area of interest, forgive me if I focus on the health =20 effects of income inequality. A question which has preoccupied =20 health researchers/sociologists, and even health economists is =20 whether, indeed, the growing gap between the rich and poor is good =20 for a society's health (let's use mortality, a nice objective =20 indicator. Dying young is less good than dying old, all else being =20 equal). There are reasons to believe that income inequality hurts everyone, =20 even those not on the bottom. Let's assume two states have the same =20 average income-- $50,000. In one state, the distribution is pretty =20 wide, so there are people really poor and people really rich; in =20 another, the distribution hovers around the $50,000 mark. Which =20 state would we want to live in, from a health perspective at least? =20 Research suggests that it would SUCK to live in the first for a =20 couple of reasons. First off, in an unequal society, you are much =20 more likely to be in the bottom than on the top, and being poor is a =20 well-established cause of bad health. Second, David Marmot, an =20 epidemiologist, has argued that simply being in a stratified society =20 can harm health. A twenty-five-year follow-up from the Whitehall =20 study found that the higher the position in the occupational =20 hierarchy in Britain, the lower the mortality rate from all causes, =20 from coronary heart disease, and from a range of diseases not related = to smoking Note that NONE of these men was poor in any usual sense =20 of that word. They were all in stable, office-based employment in and = around Whitehall, London. (Marmot, "Inequalities in Health," New =20 England Journal of Medicine (12 July 2001): 134=96136). Here, = relative =20 income deprivation mattered more than absolute. But even beyond that, it seems that a society with large income =20 inequality hurts those at the top. One of the more famous studies, =20 by George Kaplan of U. of Michigan and colleagues (1996) examined =20 income inequality among the 50 states. Kaplan et al. showed that =20 that income share held by the least well-off 50 percent of the =20 population in each state was strongly correlated with the state's =20 mortality in 1990 (r=3D-.62, p<.0001), and that this association was =20 not affected by median state income, was consistent across age =20 groups, and ALL income brackets. Moreover, areas with high income =20 inequality have not only high mortality but high crime rates, =20 especially of homicide. Such factors can affect everyone, not just =20 the poorest ( M. Wilson and M. Daly, "Life Expectancy, Economic =20 Inequality, Homicide, and Reproductive Timing in Chicago =20 Neighbourhoods," British Medical Journal (26 April 1997): = 1271=961274). T But even assuming that the "utility" gained in terms of health for =20 rich people was unaffected by the distribution of income, it may =20 still make "economic" sense to have a less unequal society. It may =20 be more efficient and maximizing everyone's utility. Angus Deaton, =20 a British health economist, has shown that there is a nonlinear =20 increase in probability of dying with decreasing income (Deaton, =20 "Health Inequality and Economic Development",Working paper, Princeton = University Research Program in Development Studies and Center for =20 Health and Wellbeing, 2001). Meaning, that if, at low levels of GNP, = a small increase corresponds to a large increase in longevity, then =20 taking some money from rich people will have less effect on their =20 mortality than giving the same money to the poor will affect theirs. =20 Therefore, other things being equal, a population with more =20 egalitarian distribution of income will have better health than =20 another with the same average income but greater income inequality. Here are some other articles attached for more discussion on the = matter. --Michelle -------------------------------------------------------------------------= ----- > I have to respond to your yootles critique first! > Our aim is both to decrease to next to nothing the overhead of =20 > applying more formal mechanisms to decision-making (and more =20 > recently, prediction and prediction+decisions) as well as convince =20 > you there's plenty to be gained. Bethany and I yootle every day =20 > for every little (and big) thing imaginable. (Being both =20 > indecisive types it often saves us a ton of time.) Granted, we're =20 > gigantic dorks and no one else cares yet. > > I'm of course not done defending my boyfriend Paul either. More on = > that later. > > But I'm actually delighted that we're making real progress on =20 > circumscribing the disagreement while identifying common ground =20 > (eg, Graham is at least right in some other fantasy universe; =20 > Trixie won't like that concession at all! and of course I conceded = > on slavery and may do so on health care, where basic human rights =20 > are at stake.. although Kevin may set you straight on the =20 > healthcare issue!). > > > --- \/ FROM James W Mickens AT 07.08.31 22:21 (Yesterday) \/ --- > >>> You're characterizing our disagreement as hinging on whether = public >>> policy should optimize economics subject to moral constraints or >>> optimize morality subject to economic constraints. I'm unclear =20 >>> on what >>> either of those really mean for public policy. >> >> >> There's a difference in the intent of your policy and the methods =20 >> that you will use to evaluate it. For example, suppose that you've = >> devised a new tax code for an underdeveloped country. When you =20 >> evaluate its success, will you look at how much additional wealth =20 >> it generated, or some actual measure of utility such as the =20 >> percentage of citizens who have access to electricity or clean =20 >> water? I use the term "actual measure of utility" because I think =20 >> that just examining, say, the increase in GDP is a bad way to =20 >> measure net social welfare. The net wealth of a society is, at =20 >> best, an indirect measure of its net welfare because aggregate =20 >> wealth trends tell us nothing about the *distribution* of wealth =20 >> or whether that wealth is being used to satisfy some particular =20 >> goal. The classic example is health care. Despite rising levels of = >> aggregate wealth in America, many *individual* Americans have poor = >> health and inadequate access to proper medical care. Is the =20 >> solution to this problem the creation of even more wealth in the =20 >> hope that the health care industry will spontaneously reorganize? =20 >> Or is the solution a targeted policy, whether it be nationalized =20 >> health care, better health education in schools, and/or something =20 >> else? I argue that the latter approach would be better, =20 >> particularly since the market has thus far been ineffective in =20 >> addressing this issue. >> >> The failure of wealth-driven policies is even more obvious in the =20 >> international pharmaceutical market, where drug companies develop =20 >> medicines for diseases that affluent people care about (e.g., =20 >> restless leg syndrome, diabetes) and ignore a huge number of =20 >> illnesses (e.g., diarrheal diseases) that affect a much larger =20 >> number of people who have much less money. People who care about =20 >> net welfare should find this problematic. So, in the international = >> drug market, should we pursue wealth-driven or morality-driven =20 >> policies? In other words, should we allow drug companies to =20 >> maximize their profits and hope that they'll turn a charitable eye = >> towards the developing world, or should we force them through =20 >> regulation, subsidies, tax credits, etc., to address the needs of =20 >> poorer countries? History suggests that the former strategy will =20 >> fail if you're trying to optimize for health and not profit. >> >> I understand that it is extremely expensive to develop new drugs =20 >> and that pharmaceutical companies must be given a way to recoup =20 >> these costs. However, it's obvious that a market system which =20 >> focuses on maximizing their profits will not lead to a net =20 >> increase in global health (an important utility metric). >> >> >> >>> Let me first defend Graham's point. He concedes whole classes of = >>> exceptions and I think social injustices are included, if not =20 >>> explicitly. His argument -- that income inequality is not, =20 >>> inherently, unjust -- remains intact. >> >> Once again, I'm claiming that economic justness does not equal =20 >> moral justness. When you say that income inequality is "not =20 >> inherently unjust," you should specify whether you refer to the =20 >> economic definition, the moral definition, or both. >> >> If Graham includes social injustice in his exceptions list, then I = >> suppose that he and I are in agreement. But if Graham believes in =20 >> the entrenched, pervasive nature of social injustice, why does he =20 >> spend so much time waxing poetic about the inherent fairness of =20 >> economic inequality? This fairness only exists in an idealized =20 >> model of the economy which bears little resemblance to the real =20 >> one. The fact that Graham spends most of his time talking about =20 >> this idealized world suggests that either a) he is a hopeless =20 >> utopian, or b) he does not, in fact, believe that social injustice = >> is entrenched and pervasive ;-). >> >> ~j >> >> >> p.s. >> >>> And just to nip a potential subthread: the non-mathematically =20 >>> inclined are not allowed to blithely declare human motivation to =20 >>> be irreducible to mathematics. >> >> Ah, but I claim that the mathematically inclined are not allowed =20 >> to blithely declare that human motivation *is* reducible to =20 >> mathematics ;-). The reason that I do not use yootles to determine = >> who will pick me up from the airport is that, in the common case, =20 >> this decision is not subject to rigorous mathematical or economic =20 >> constraints, nor should it be. In many scenarios, I only care =20 >> about approximate notions of fairness. I suppose that if gasoline =20 >> were $27,000 a gallon, it might be reasonable to employ a strong =20 >> mathematical framework to prevent tragedy (e.g., "Oh no, Todd has =20 >> taken me to the airport fifteen times but I haven't taken him at =20 >> all. Todd has now spent $405,000 on gas while I have escaped scot-=20 >> free."). Absent such extreme conditions, the introduction of =20 >> mathematics into simple human transactions will often just add =20 >> overhead and produce little tangible benefit. >> >> It is frequently possible and fruitful to analyze people's =20 >> behavior using mathematical models. However, that doesn't mean =20 >> that the underlying psychology of the individual is actually =20 >> driven by these models, or that giving the math to people will =20 >> make it easier for them to manage their lives. >> > > --=20 > http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/dreeves - - search://"Daniel = Reeves" > > Dilbert: "...and we'll buy a dozen of these. We're trying to > spend our budget so it doesn't get cut next year." > Salesperson: "This is great! You guys are so dumb that I don't even > have to use my fake personality to make the sale!" > > > ------=_NextPart_000_003A_01C7ED69.64FF4B30 Content-Type: text/html; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Great text!

This puts a completly new view to the = subject. If=20 the research data is real, I am convinced that too much inequality is = bad for=20 all. What can be more important than having a long and healthy live. The = problem=20 seems to be the proper balance. In Cuba, the health situation seems to = be fairly=20 good. But how important is the happiness?

Franz,

the darwinistic = environmentalist

----- Original Message -----

From:=20 Michelle = Sternthal=20

To: Daniel Reeves

Cc: James W Mickens ; Dave = Morris ; improvetheworld Æ umich.edu = ; Steven = Reeves ; reeves-hayos Æ umich.edu ; reeves-kalkman Æ umich.edu =

Sent: Saturday, September 01, = 2007 4:11=20 PM

Subject: Re: mind the gap

I have remained silent for too long! I have to = admit,=20 that as a
sociologist, the notion that income = inequality is=20 good for society
is anathema to our discipline (which is = probably=20 one reason
sociologists and economists have a noted=20 rivalry).

But putting intellectual/philosophical disagreements = aside,=20 from a
purely rhetorical/debate perspective, I have been = somewhat=20 frustrated
by the notable absence of empirical evidence used = to back=20 up the
arguments that income equality is good for society or = at=20 least
"fair."   Since we are loyal positivists who = embrace=20 the scientific
method, allow me to introduce some = research on=20 the matter.

Since my area of interest, forgive me if I focus on = the=20 health
effects of income inequality. A question which = has=20 preoccupied
health researchers/sociologists, and even health = economists is
whether, indeed, the growing gap between the = rich and=20 poor is good
for a society's health (let's use mortality, a = nice=20 objective
indicator. Dying young is less good than = dying old,=20 all else being
equal).

There are reasons to believe = that=20 income inequality hurts everyone,
even those not on the=20 bottom. Let's assume two states have the same
average = income--=20 $50,000. In one state, the distribution is pretty =
wide, so=20 there are people really poor and people really rich; in =
another, the=20 distribution hovers around the $50,000 mark. Which =
state would=20 we want to live in, from a health perspective at least?  =20
Research suggests that it would SUCK to live in the first for = a =20
couple of reasons. First off, in an unequal society, you are = much
more likely to be in the bottom than on the top, and = being poor=20 is a
well-established cause of bad health.    = Second,=20 David Marmot, an
epidemiologist, has argued that simply = being in a=20 stratified society
can harm health. A twenty-five-year = follow-up from the Whitehall
study found that the higher the = position in the occupational
hierarchy in Britain, the lower = the=20 mortality rate from all causes,
from coronary heart disease, = and=20 from a range of diseases not related
to smoking Note = that NONE=20 of these men was poor in any usual sense
of that word. = They=20 were all in stable, office-based employment in and
around = Whitehall,=20 London. (Marmot, "Inequalities in Health," New
England = Journal=20 of Medicine (12 July 2001): 134=96136). Here, relative =
income=20 deprivation mattered more than absolute.

But even beyond that, = it seems=20 that a society with large income
inequality hurts = those at the=20 top. One of the more famous studies,
by George Kaplan = of U. of=20 Michigan and colleagues (1996) examined
income inequality = among the=20 50 states. Kaplan et al. showed that
that income share = held by=20 the least well-off 50 percent of the
population in each = state was=20 strongly correlated with the state's
mortality in 1990 = (r=3D-.62,=20 p<.0001), and that this association was
not affected by = median=20 state income, was consistent across age
groups, and ALL = income=20 brackets.   Moreover, areas with high income =
inequality=20 have not only high mortality but high crime rates, =
especially of=20 homicide. Such factors can affect everyone, not just =
the=20 poorest ( M. Wilson and M. Daly, "Life Expectancy, Economic =20
Inequality, Homicide, and Reproductive Timing in Chicago =20
Neighbourhoods," British Medical Journal (26 April 1997): = 1271=961274).=20 T

But even assuming that the "utility" gained in terms of = health=20 for
rich people was unaffected by the distribution of = income, it=20 may
still make "economic" sense to have a less unequal=20 society. It may
be more efficient and maximizing = everyone's=20 utility.   Angus Deaton,
a British health = economist, has=20 shown that there is a nonlinear
increase in probability of = dying=20 with decreasing income (Deaton,
"Health Inequality and = Economic=20 Development",Working paper, Princeton
University Research = Program in=20 Development Studies and Center for
Health and Wellbeing,=20 2001). Meaning, that if, at low levels of GNP,
a small = increase corresponds to a large increase in longevity, then =
taking=20 some money from rich people will have less effect on their =
mortality=20 than giving the same money to the poor will affect theirs. =20
Therefore, other things being equal, a population with more =20
egalitarian distribution of income will have better health = than =20
another with the same average income but greater income=20 inequality.

Here are some other articles attached for more=20 discussion on the matter.

--Michelle

> I have to respond to your yootles critique=20 first!
> Our aim is both to decrease to next to nothing = the=20 overhead of
> applying more formal mechanisms to = decision-making=20 (and more
> recently, prediction and = prediction+decisions) as=20 well as convince
> you there's plenty to be gained. = Bethany=20 and I yootle every day
> for every little (and big) thing = imaginable. (Being both
> indecisive types it often = saves=20 us a ton of time.) Granted, we're
> gigantic dorks and no = one=20 else cares yet.
>
> I'm of course not done defending my = boyfriend=20 Paul either. More on
> that later.
>
> = But I'm=20 actually delighted that we're making real progress on
>=20 circumscribing the disagreement while identifying common ground =
>=20 (eg, Graham is at least right in some other fantasy universe; =
>=20 Trixie won't like that concession at all! and of course I = conceded =20
> on slavery and may do so on health care, where basic human=20 rights
> are at stake.. although Kevin may set you = straight on=20 the
> healthcare issue!).
>
>
> ---=20 \/   FROM James W Mickens AT 07.08.31 22:21 = (Yesterday)  =20 \/ ---
>
>>> You're characterizing our disagreement = as=20 hinging on whether public
>>> policy should optimize = economics=20 subject to moral constraints or
>>> optimize morality = subject to=20 economic constraints. I'm unclear
>>> on=20 what
>>> either of those really mean for public=20 policy.
>>
>>
>> There's a difference in = the intent=20 of your policy and the methods
>> that you will use to = evaluate it. For example, suppose that you've
>> = devised a new=20 tax code for an underdeveloped country. When you
>> = evaluate=20 its success, will you look at how much additional wealth =
>> it=20 generated, or some actual measure of utility such as the =
>>=20 percentage of citizens who have access to electricity or clean =20
>> water? I use the term "actual measure of utility" because = I=20 think
>> that just examining, say, the increase in GDP = is a=20 bad way to
>> measure net social welfare. The net = wealth of a=20 society is, at
>> best, an indirect measure of its net = welfare=20 because aggregate
>> wealth trends tell us nothing = about the=20 *distribution* of wealth
>> or whether that wealth is = being=20 used to satisfy some particular
>> goal. The classic = example=20 is health care. Despite rising levels of
>> aggregate = wealth=20 in America, many *individual* Americans have poor
>> = health=20 and inadequate access to proper medical care. Is the =
>>=20 solution to this problem the creation of even more wealth in the =
>> hope that the health care industry will spontaneously=20 reorganize?
>> Or is the solution a targeted policy, = whether=20 it be nationalized
>> health care, better health = education in=20 schools, and/or something
>> else? I argue that the = latter=20 approach would be better,
>> particularly since the = market has=20 thus far been ineffective in
>> addressing this=20 issue.
>>
>> The failure of wealth-driven policies = is even=20 more obvious in the
>> international pharmaceutical = market,=20 where drug companies develop
>> medicines for diseases = that=20 affluent people care about (e.g.,
>> restless leg = syndrome,=20 diabetes) and ignore a huge number of
>> illnesses = (e.g.,=20 diarrheal diseases) that affect a much larger
>> = number of=20 people who have much less money. People who care about =
>> net=20 welfare should find this problematic. So, in the international =20
>> drug market, should we pursue wealth-driven or=20 morality-driven
>> policies? In other words, should we = allow=20 drug companies to
>> maximize their profits and hope = that=20 they'll turn a charitable eye
>> towards the = developing world,=20 or should we force them through
>> regulation, = subsidies, tax=20 credits, etc., to address the needs of
>> poorer = countries?=20 History suggests that the former strategy will
>> fail = if=20 you're trying to optimize for health and not = profit.
>>
>> I=20 understand that it is extremely expensive to develop new drugs =20
>> and that pharmaceutical companies must be given a way to=20 recoup
>> these costs. However, it's obvious that a = market=20 system which
>> focuses on maximizing their profits = will not=20 lead to a net
>> increase in global health (an = important=20 utility metric).
>>
>>
>>
>>> = Let me=20 first defend Graham's point. He concedes whole classes of =20
>>> exceptions and I think social injustices are = included, if=20 not
>>> explicitly. His argument -- that income = inequality=20 is not,
>>> inherently, unjust -- remains=20 intact.
>>
>> Once again, I'm claiming that economic = justness does not equal
>> moral justness. When you = say that=20 income inequality is "not
>> inherently unjust," you = should=20 specify whether you refer to the
>> economic = definition, the=20 moral definition, or both.
>>
>> If Graham includes = social=20 injustice in his exceptions list, then I
>> suppose = that he=20 and I are in agreement. But if Graham believes in
>> = the=20 entrenched, pervasive nature of social injustice, why does he =20
>> spend so much time waxing poetic about the inherent = fairness=20 of
>> economic inequality? This fairness only exists = in an=20 idealized
>> model of the economy which bears little=20 resemblance to the real
>> one. The fact that Graham = spends=20 most of his time talking about
>> this idealized world = suggests that either a) he is a hopeless
>> utopian, = or b) he=20 does not, in fact, believe that social injustice
>> is = entrenched and pervasive ;-).
>>
>>=20 ~j
>>
>>
>> = p.s.
>>
>>> And=20 just to nip a potential subthread: the non-mathematically =20
>>> inclined are not allowed to blithely declare human = motivation=20 to
>>> be irreducible to=20 mathematics.
>>
>> Ah, but I claim that the = mathematically=20 inclined are not allowed
>> to blithely declare that = human=20 motivation *is* reducible to
>> mathematics ;-). The = reason=20 that I do not use yootles to determine
>> who will = pick me up=20 from the airport is that, in the common case,
>> this = decision=20 is not subject to rigorous mathematical or economic
>> = constraints, nor should it be. In many scenarios, I only care =20
>> about approximate notions of fairness. I suppose that if=20 gasoline
>> were $27,000 a gallon, it might be = reasonable to=20 employ a strong
>> mathematical framework to prevent = tragedy=20 (e.g., "Oh no, Todd has
>> taken me to the airport = fifteen=20 times but I haven't taken him at
>> all. Todd has now = spent=20 $405,000 on gas while I have escaped scot-
>> free."). = Absent such=20 extreme conditions, the introduction of
>> mathematics = into=20 simple human transactions will often just add
>> = overhead and=20 produce little tangible benefit.
>>
>> It is = frequently=20 possible and fruitful to analyze people's
>> behavior = using=20 mathematical models. However, that doesn't mean
>> = that the=20 underlying psychology of the individual is actually
>> = driven=20 by these models, or that giving the math to people will =
>>=20 make it easier for them to manage their = lives.
>>
>
> --=20
> http://ai.eecs.umich.edu= /people/dreeves =20 - - search://"Daniel Reeves"
>
>=20 Dilbert:     "...and we'll buy a dozen of these. = We're=20 trying=20 = to
>          &nb= sp;  =20 spend our budget so it doesn't get cut next year."
> = Salesperson: "This=20 is great! You guys are so dumb that I don't=20 = even
>          &= nbsp;  =20 have to use my fake personality to make the=20 sale!"
>
>
>

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