On Mon, 14 Aug 2006, Laurie Reeves wrote:

> Well Danny, after reading all the replys to this issue so far I would 
> say you have not persuaded me to your argument that such security 
> attempts are useless.

How about Bruce Schneier's argument?

>From http://www.startribune.com/562/story/609687.html:

Bruce Schneier: Focus on terrorists, not tactics

It's easy to defend against what they planned last time, but it's 
shortsighted.

Hours-long waits in the security line. Ridiculous prohibitions on what you 
can carry onboard. Last week's foiling of a major terrorist plot and the 
subsequent airport security graphically illustrates the difference between 
effective security and security theater.

None of the airplane security measures implemented because of 9/11 -- 
no-fly lists, secondary screening, prohibitions against pocket knives and 
corkscrews -- had anything to do with last week's arrests. And they 
wouldn't have prevented the planned attacks, had the terrorists not been 
arrested. A national ID card wouldn't have made a difference, either.

Instead, the arrests are a victory for old-fashioned intelligence and 
investigation. Details are still secret, but police in at least two 
countries were watching the terrorists for a long time. They followed 
leads, figured out who was talking to whom, and slowly pieced together 
both the network and the plot.

The new airplane security measures focus on that plot, because authorities 
believe they have not captured everyone involved. It's reasonable to 
assume that a few lone plotters, knowing their compatriots are in jail and 
fearing their own arrest, would try to finish the job on their own. The 
authorities are not being public with the details -- much of the 
"explosive liquid" story doesn't hang together -- but the excessive 
security measures seem prudent.

But only temporarily. Banning box cutters since 9/11, or taking off our 
shoes since Richard Reid, has not made us any safer. And a long-term 
prohibition against liquid carry-ons won't make us safer, either. It's not 
just that there are ways around the rules, it's that focusing on tactics 
is a losing proposition.

It's easy to defend against what the terrorists planned last time, but 
it's shortsighted. If we spend billions fielding liquid-analysis machines 
in airports and the terrorists use solid explosives, we've wasted our 
money. If they target shopping malls, we've wasted our money. Focusing on 
tactics simply forces the terrorists to make a minor modification in their 
plans. There are too many targets -- stadiums, schools, theaters, 
churches, the long line of densely packed people before airport security 
-- and too many ways to kill people.

Security measures that require us to guess correctly don't work, because 
invariably we will guess wrong. It's not security, it's security theater: 
measures designed to make us feel safer but not actually safer.

Airport security is the last line of defense, and not a very good one at 
that. Sure, it'll catch the sloppy and the stupid -- and that's a good 
enough reason not to do away with it entirely -- but it won't catch a 
well-planned plot. We can't keep weapons out of prisons; we can't possibly 
keep them off airplanes.

The goal of a terrorist is to cause terror. Last week's arrests 
demonstrate how real security doesn't focus on possible terrorist tactics, 
but on the terrorists themselves. It's a victory for intelligence and 
investigation, and a dramatic demonstration of how investments in these 
areas pay off.

And if you want to know what you can do to help? Don't be terrorized. They 
terrorize more of us if they kill some of us, but the dead are beside the 
point. If we give in to fear, the terrorists achieve their goal even if 
they were arrested. If we refuse to be terrorized, then they lose -- even 
if their attacks succeed.