MarketBayes: A Computational Market in Uncertain Propositions

Michael P. Wellman and David M. Pennock

The MarketBayes project is an effort to explore the distribution of uncertain reasoning and decision making in a general setting based on economic market mechanisms.

The function of markets as aggregators of uncertain belief are well-recognized. For example, the price of a stock represents the "market evaluation" of the expected present value of future dividends, and odds in a horse race aggregate the bettors' beliefs about the winning horse's identity. But despite their commonality and well-developed underlying theory, there has been little or no work in the uncertain reasoning community on principled application of market ideas for distributed uncertain reasoning (but see (Hanson, 1995) for advocacy of the idea in a related context).

Our basic approach is to set up markets for uncertain propositions, essentially financial securities that pay off contingent on uncertain events. Agents bid on these propositions according to their beliefs, subject to their wealth constraints and tempered by their confidence and risk aversion. In equilibrium, the market prices can be interpreted as a consensus probability of the participants in the market.

To investigate this idea, we performed a study of the expressive power of these kinds of markets compared to standard techniques for probabilistic reasoning. In particular, we constructed an economic model, called MarketBayes, that can represent arbitrary joint probability distributions, exploiting dependence structure in a manner similar to Bayesian networks (Pennock and Wellman 1996). Given an arbitrary Bayesian network, our algorithm generates a MarketBayes economy such that the prices of propositions in the unique competitive equilibrium corresponds exactly to probabilities in the Bayesian networks.

Our mapping is depicted schematically below. The MarketBayes economy is comprised of two types of agents, consumers and producers, each of which bids on a selected set of uncertain propositions (conjunctions of random variables and their negations). Consumers represent conditional probabilities in terms of the tradeoff between the conditioning proposition and its conjunction with the proposition conditioned. The laws of probability are represented by producers. For example, the producer in the figure arbitrages on the goods A, AB, and AB', ensuring that the price of the first equals the sum of prices of the latter two.


Translation of a Bayesian network to a MarketBayes economy.

MarketBayes has been implemented within our general environment for market-oriented programming (Wellman 1993). The details of MarketBayes are presented in our recent article (Pennock and Wellman 1996). Some specific computational details of early experiments are also described online.

References

  1. Hanson, Robin D. 1995. Could gambling save science? Encouraging an honest consensus. Social Epistemology 9:3-33.
  2. Pennock, David M., and Michael P. Wellman. 1996. Toward a market model for Bayesian inference. In Twelfth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Portland, OR. [abstract]
  3. Wellman, Michael P. 1993. A market-oriented programming environment and its application to distributed multicommodity flow problems. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 1:1-23. [abstract]