Designed and implemented by Tracy Mullen and Michael Wellman.
WALRAS formulation:
This economy was developed as an extension to the WALRAS generic transportation economy. Our description below
describes the differences.
Goods
In addition to transport on a link and basic
transportation resources (in this case, effective network
bandwidth), the available goods include:
The consumer agent bids to maximize utility subject to its budget constraint, in the conventional manner.
Producers
In addition to carriers and network arbitrageurs, the Blue-Skies economy
includes three other producer types. Manufacturers produce
particular computational resources (e.g., processing, storage) or
information goods (Blue-Skies) from the generic (amalgamated) resource
goods. Delivery arbitrageurs are similar to transportation network
arbitrageurs, except they bundle information services at a location (e.g.,
Blue-Skies@internet) with transport from that location to another (e.g,
local-site), to produce that service at the second location
(Blue-Skies@local-site). Finally, the mirror provider has the capability of transforming local storage and
other resources into provision of the information service at its local
site. It can also choose to access the service from another site instead
of mirroring, in which case it acts just like the delivery arbitrageur.
Results
Depending on the initial configuration, the Blue-Skies economy exhibits a
range of interesting behaviors. If there is sufficient demand
at a local site, the mirror provider will set up a local
cache. If there is not sufficient demand locally, the mirror
site may still be profitable if the service can be resold to
other sites.
For some values of the parameters, the behavior oscillates. When there are no mirror sites, there is a lot of network traffic and a relatively high price of bandwidth, and thus it appears profitable to set up a mirror site. But once the mirror is set up, traffic decreases as does the price of bandwidth, and so direct access to the internet appears to be cheaper. This phenomenon is a direct consequence of applying the competitiveness assumption when there are a small number of agents. With a larger number (bigger network, more diverse set of services available), the effect of one mirroring decision would have a negligible impact on overall traffic, and hence this oscillation would be ameliorated.
T. Mullen and M.P. Wellman. A simple computational market for network information services. to appear in First International Conference on Multiagent Systems, June 1995.
See the references in this paper for other related work.