This is a good article about our trade deficit, and it's implications.
Not only are we screwed because we're not really very competitive in
the global market in any sector anymore (or are heading that way), but
the world is screwed because much of it depends on our rampant
over-consumption which we cannot sustain. On the other hand, we've had
an unfair advantage and used more than our share of the planet for some
time now, so it's good to see the end of that coming. Kind of like the
fall of Rome. A lot like that, actually. I vote for China as the next
new power, especially if they get their nuclear reactors online before
the collapse. Regardless the next few decades should be exciting. In
the meantime I'll continue to work on ways to get off planet. :-)
Dave Morris
University of Michigan EM PhD candidate, aka thecat Æ umich.edu, aka
KB8PWY
home: 734-995-5525 office (2104 SPRL): 734-763-5357 fax: 734-763-5567
http://www.americaneconomicalert.org/view_art.asp?Prod_ID 77
New Trade Deficit Figures Turning US Economy into a Disaster Movie
Alan Tonelson
Friday, February 11, 2005
This week Washington issued a report on America’s trade performance
that only an Irwin Allen could love. You remember Allen, right? The
master of 1960s and 1970s cinematic extravaganzas like “The Towering
Inferno”and “The Poseidon Adventure”? Well, the year-end 2004 trade
figures published on Feb. 10 by the Department of Commerce are the
economic equivalent of a disaster movie.
New records were set all over the place – but not the kind any well-run
economy would seek. The overall 2004 U.S. trade deficit (goods and
services) hit a record $617.7 billion, shattering last year's record of
$496.51 billion by a staggering 24.4 percent. In yet another new
record, the deficit’s share of the U.S. economy jumped from 4.5
percent in 2003 to 5.3 percent in 2004.
Total exports of goods and services rose $125.6 billion to $1.146
trillion, an increase of 12.3 percent. Could this be a sign that the
dollar’s recent weakness against most major currencies is finally
giving U.S.-made goods a price advantage in world markets? Maybe. But
why, then, did total imports of goods and services rise $246.9 billion
(roughly twice the export increase) to $1.764 trillion, an increase of
16.28 percent? Why didn’t this price advantage seem to matter much at
home, where imports continued to eat into domestic producers’ sales and
employment?
Many analysts put much of the blame on oil, and the final 2004 figures
clearly show that America’s addiction to oil imports continues to
intensify. The oil trade deficit worsened by a stunning 36.21 percent
last year, to $164 billion, reflecting not only increased volume
imports but much higher prices. Yet the non-oil goods deficit rose
18.35 percent – a hefty gain – and is nearly three times larger.
Clearly, America's trade problems are much more than an oil problem.
To no one’s surprise, the U.S. deficit in manufactures continued to
soar, increasing 17.6 percent in 2004, from $469.45 billion to $552.06
billion. 2004 exports did rise $65.49 billion, or 11.4%, to $623.44
billion. The weak-dollar effect again? Again, maybe. But again,
seemingly beside the point, as the much larger volume of imports
increased by $148.1 billion, or 14.42 percent, to $1.176 trillion.
Since manufactures dominate U.S. trade flows, new confirmation that
imports not only dwarf exports but are rising considerably faster
underscores a critically important message: With one exception, neither
the weak dollar nor any other touted hope or strategy has a prayer of
restoring sustainability to America’s international accounts. And the
one exception is a deep, prolonged economic downturn.
Certainly, no one should look to the service sector to rebalance the
trade flows. Services are almost universally trumpeted as not only the
inevitable future of the American economy, but its best hope for future
prosperity. The longstanding U.S. services surplus, however, is rapidly
becoming history. Between 2003 and 2004, this surplus shrank by just
over five percent, with imports growing about one third faster than
exports. More disturbingly, the decline of the service sector surplus
since 2002 has been a whopping 20.77 percent. The unavoidable bottom
line: U.S. competitiveness in this sector is faltering badly.
Even worse is the news about the “other private services” category,
which includes high-paying info-tech and professional services work.
This sector of the economy employs America’s best and brightest, and
pays its highest wages. Yet this longstanding surplus has been eroding
steadily as well – by 1.92 percent since 2002, to $47.99 billion.
Such a decline may seem modest and indeed hardly newsworthy at all. But
in “other private services,” the United States and its providers should
be wracking up large and rising surpluses. Otherwise, the numbers of
Americans who can expect employment as software engineers, network
administrators, financial analysts, lawyers, and doctors, may remain
stuck at current levels. And if employment in these sectors rises, the
reason is likely to be that American pay levels have sunk toward the
much lower global norm.
Humongous U.S. trade deficits with China are no longer news, but the
2004 China figures give pause nonetheless. The China goods deficit rose
from $124.1 billion to $162 billion, a $37.9 billion increase, or 30.53
percent This is a faster increase than that of the overall U.S. goods
deficit. As a result, the China goods deficit currently makes up fully
28 percent of the total global U.S. goods deficit. (Country-by-country
figures for 2004 services trade are not available yet.)
For some reason, globalization cheerleaders look at a Chinese economy
growing at near-double digit rates and view its modest recent deficits
and surpluses as a sign that China has become a major engine of growth
for the rest of the world. What they conveniently forget is that an
economy growing that fast should be in deep deficit with the rest of
the world; it should be sucking in net imports like crazy. China’s
more-or-less evenly balanced trade with the rest of the world is
glaring evidence of its mercantilist trade practices, and of its role
as a major drain on the world’s wealth-creating capabilities along the
lines of Japan in recent decades.
Of course, America’s trade with China is anything but balanced. U.S.
exports to the People’s Republic did rise in 2004 by $6.4 billion to
$34.7 billion, an increase of 22.6 percent. But the much greater tide
of U.S. imports from China rose $44.3 billion to $196.7 billion, a
29.07 percent jump.
Meanwhile, U.S.-European trade trends should be driving a stake through
the heart of weak-dollar hopes. The Euro has been the currency against
which the dollar has been weakest for two years. Yet the U.S. goods
deficit with the Euro area (those European countries that have actually
adopted the Euro) climbed $8.85 billion in 2004, a 11.95% increase.
Exports rose $14 billion (a 12.4 percent increase), while imports rose
$22.86 billion (a 12.2 percent increase).
Since new exchange rates almost never produce immediate or rapid
changes in purchasing and importing patterns, some lag between the
dollar’s weakening and a narrowing of the trade gap with
strong-currency countries has to be expected. Indeed, if a
weak-currency country has to import goods even though their prices rise
(e.g., because these goods are no longer made domestically), the trade
deficit may increase for a while. Economists call this delayed swing in
the trade balance the “J-curve” effect.
At the same time, a weakening currency also may not affect trade
balances much because the strong-currency country may have in place
formidable trade barriers that restrict the weak-currency country’s
exports. And the J-curve could take many years to play itself out.
Americans have consistently experienced this problem with Japan. The
Euro area might be an exception, but the jury is still out.
The possible limits of the weak-dollar policy become even clearer from
examining America’s trade with Canada. Despite the Canadian dollar’s
major appreciation against the greenback, the total U.S. goods deficit
with Canada climbed $14.1 billion in 2004 to $65.77 billion. This 27.3
percent increase was nearly as fast a rise as that of the U.S. goods
deficit with China – which brazenly manipulates its exchange rate.
Exports rose $20.24 billion to $190.16 billion (an 11.91% increase),
while imports rose $34.33 billion to $255.93 billion (a 15.5%
increase).
The U.S. trade patterns revealed by the final 2004 trade figures are a
national disgrace and a global danger. They remind us once more how
perilously dependent the world has become on U.S. consumption, and yet
how America’s ability to finance this consumption responsibly keeps
eroding. Maybe the nation’s globalization cheer-leading political and
economic establishments think that, like disaster movies, this story
ultimately has a happy ending. When will they realize this isn’t
Hollywood?
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