Message Number: 497
From: Daniel Reeves <dreeves Æ umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2006 11:05:04 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine (fwd)
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---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2006 10:59:16 -0400
From: peter honeyman  
Subject: Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine

this report was released minutes ago by ed felten's group at princeton:

Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine

This paper presents a fully independent security study of a Diebold AccuVote
-TS 
voting machine, including its hardware and software. We obtained the machine  
from a private party. Analysis of the machine, in light of real election 
procedures, shows that it is vulnerable to extremely serious attacks. For 
example, an attacker who gets physical access to a machine or its removable 
memory card for as little as one minute could install malicious code; malicious
 
code on a machine could steal votes undetectably, modifying all records, logs ,

and counters to be consistent with the fraudulent vote count it creates. An 
attacker could also create malicious code that spreads automatically and 
silently from machine to machine during normal election activities a 
voting-machine virus. We have constructed working demonstrations of these 
attacks in our lab. Mitigating these threats will require changes to the voting
 
machine s hardware and software and the adoption of more rigorous election  
procedures.

the report is available at

  http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting

  peter
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