X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,SPF_HELO_PASS autolearn=ham version=3.2.0-r372567 Sender: -2.6 (spamval) -- NONE Return-Path: Received: from newman.eecs.umich.edu (newman.eecs.umich.edu [141.213.4.11]) by boston.eecs.umich.edu (8.12.10/8.13.0) with ESMTP id k7ELpgnw025593 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL) for ; Mon, 14 Aug 2006 17:51:43 -0400 Received: from dave.mr.itd.umich.edu (dave.mr.itd.umich.edu [141.211.14.70]) by newman.eecs.umich.edu (8.13.6/8.13.6) with ESMTP id k7ELpfvp019154; Mon, 14 Aug 2006 17:51:41 -0400 Received: FROM smtp.eecs.umich.edu (smtp.eecs.umich.edu [141.213.4.43]) BY dave.mr.itd.umich.edu ID 44E0F067.A05A6.24257 ; 14 Aug 2006 17:51:35 -0400 Received: from smtp.eecs.umich.edu (localhost.eecs.umich.edu [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.eecs.umich.edu (8.13.6/8.13.6) with ESMTP id k7ELpX1l009427 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 14 Aug 2006 17:51:33 -0400 Received: from localhost (binkertn Æ localhost) by smtp.eecs.umich.edu (8.13.6/8.13.2/Submit) with ESMTP id k7ELpX6G009424; Mon, 14 Aug 2006 17:51:33 -0400 X-Authentication-Warning: smtp.eecs.umich.edu: binkertn owned process doing -bs X-X-Sender: binkertn Æ smtp.eecs.umich.edu In-Reply-To: <2ff07e720608141036r3fe1af31pb178e5c0ec5764aa Æ mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: References: <20060814165517.45149.qmail Æ web38303.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <2ff07e720608141036r3fe1af31pb178e5c0ec5764aa Æ mail.gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.2.0-r372567 (2006-01-26) on newman.eecs.umich.edu X-Virus-Scan: : UVSCAN at UoM/EECS X-Virus-Scan: : UVSCAN at UoM/EECS Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2006 17:51:33 -0400 (EDT) To: Clare Dibble cc: improvetheworld Æ umich.edu From: Nathan Binkert Subject: Re: stupid feel-good "no liquids" rule Status: O X-Status: X-Keywords: X-UID: 696 > I think it is sort of interesting that the security measures were stepped up > in light of a foiled plot attempt... a sign that current measures were > _effective_. I'm probably behind in this conversation, but it's worth pointing out that the latest foiled attempt was a result of old fashioned detective work. People sitting in cars, following suspects around and figuring out who they are talking to and what they're planning to do. It had little to do with new security measures. If any of you do read what Schneier writes, he talks a lot about spending money on prevention (by real intelligence work) and limiting the impact of a successful attack (by having well trained emergency responders). He writes a about how stupid it is to try to think of all of the things that the terrorists might do because of the huge cost of guessing wrong. Even dumb people (terrorists) can have good imaginations. (If not better since it might be easier for them to think outside the box.) I think everyone who cares about a subject like this should read some of his work. Nate