Message Number: 695
From: Matt Rudary <mrudary Æ eecs.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 22 Aug 2007 13:50:27 -0400
Subject: Re: mind the gap
One problem with requiring stock ownership for some amount of time is 
that it prevents short selling. If I believe that the company is less 
valuable than public perception (i.e. the stock price), then there is no 
way for me to affect the price unless I already hold stock. It seems to 
me that this would cause stock prices to become artificially inflated.

Matt

Dave Morris wrote:
> True- any change should be implemented only incrementally, with concrete 
> metrics to measure progress or not, and metrics of other effects which 
> may not have been intended as well.	This would be hard to experiment 
> with, as many other factors influence things as well.
> 
> But what do you think of the change which recently occurred- moving to 
> computer based trading instead of paper trading, which essentially sped 
> things up. They now have in place mechanisms which detect rapid drops in 
> the market, caused by computer agents responding to each other causing 
> crashes faster than humans could intervene, and now an automated system 
> puts a pause in place when this starts to occur. So we have already 
> slowed down the stock market in one regard.
> 
> What do you think the impact would be if we slowed it down a little bit 
> more? Required stock ownership for a day? A month? A year?	What other 
> mechanisms besides requiring that you hold a stock for a specified 
> amount of time would work? It seems like it would be difficult to limit 
> volume of trading with large investment companies trading for millions 
> of people as they do.
> 
> 
> If you had to invest for at least a year, I imagine that it would slow 
> things down considerably. Stock values wouldn't change as quickly, and 
> the market would be slower to understand/figure out failures in 
> companies.  On the one hand this would remove short term 
> response/motivation to company leaders when the market disapproved of 
> their strategies, which could be devastating if the market really is 
> driving CEOs to decide how to run things on that scale.   But then it 
> might also be wiser about short term strategies versus long term gains 
> and force CEOs to think a year or two in advance instead of just about 
> the next quarter.    I wonder what the real impact would be.
> 
> Dave
> 
> On Aug 22, 2007, at 12:18 PM, Kevin Lochner wrote:
> 
>> As daniel has pointed out, the market is not perfect.  A tempting 
>> conclusion to draw from that observation is "ok, let's fix it".  I 
>> think there is reason for restraint.
>>
>> As the other students of economics should agree, there are cases where 
>> you can't explicitly determine the outcome of production & allocation 
>> and simultaneously have proper incentives for everyone in society.  
>> This doesn't necessarily preclude a "fix" to markets, but it indicates 
>> that getting to a "better" outcome is possibly harder than we 
>> imagine.  So maybe you come up with a rule that "fixes" the instances 
>> of small company buyouts, but maybe that imposes other costs on the 
>> market and society that outweigh the gains.	By analogy, I don't like 
>> getting dust in my eye, but that doesn't motivate me to wear 
>> protective goggles all day.
>>
>> It's easy to measure the tradeoff for such mundane cases, but the 
>> issue is much more subtle in the context of the global economy.  Given 
>> that each new regulation imposes some cost with respect to compliance 
>> while inherently limiting individual freedom, my position is that we 
>> should err on the side of free markets (and more generally, freedom) 
>> unless the case for regulation is compelling.  Examples of regulation 
>> gone awry include our disaster of a tax code and the
>> criminalization of drug use.  Once imposed, such regulation is not 
>> quickly nor easily revoked.
>>
>> - k
>>
>>
>> On Wed, 22 Aug 2007, Dave Morris wrote:
>>
>>> That's a good point- if it's already criminal, we've done what we can 
>>> to correct it, which ideally solves the Enron case.
>>>
>>> The real problem is in the case where what the evil CEO is doing is 
>>> legal. Like taking a small not for profit company for profit and 
>>> making a ton off the stock sales selling it to a big company that 
>>> wrecks it. The small company looks good on the stock market 
>>> temporarily, and the big company looks good temporarily for buying 
>>> it, but when the big company strategy ruins the value of the small 
>>> company everything is lost in the long run. But that happens 5 years 
>>> later, so short selling over that period is impractical, or just not 
>>> the norm, for most investors, so the market doesn't seem to correct 
>>> for it.
>>>
>>> Any suggestions or counter arguments for that example?
>>>
>>>
>>> On Aug 22, 2007, at 10:31 AM, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik wrote:
>>>
>>>> I think the argument to the "evil CEO" examples would run as 
>>>> follows. Suppose that CEO does something that he knows will cause 
>>>> the company's imminent collapse.  Naturally, he's the only one who 
>>>> knows this.  The problem with the reasoning below is the implicit 
>>>> assumption that the CEO will not play the stock market.  But in 
>>>> theory, the CEO should short cell shares until the price comes down 
>>>> to roughly what he/she expects it to be. In the end, he'll make 
>>>> additional billions of dollars, while the market price will 
>>>> accurately forcast imminent collapse.  That would be the theory. In 
>>>> reality, something seems to prevent a CEO from doing just that (at 
>>>> least conspicuously).  One would be the laws against insider 
>>>> trading. Another would be that he is in effect giving evidence to 
>>>> his own wrongdoing.  There is also the issue of transaction costs, 
>>>> but that's probably more minor here.
>>>> I think the problem of "evil CEO" is really entirely separate from 
>>>> that of stock market inaccuracy.  If the CEO is indeed evil, you 
>>>> certainly to want to create additional incentives for wrongdoing by 
>>>> creating another opportunity for them to cash in.	The issue may be 
>>>> insufficient enforcement of accounting crimes, etc. on the part of 
>>>> company executives. That's where the incentives really need to be to 
>>>> "behave".
>>>> On Wed, 22 Aug 2007, Dave Morris wrote:
>>>>> You point out some potential benefits, and others have pointed out 
>>>>> specific examples. I agree with these, but my argument is not that 
>>>>> the stock market should be abolished. It does provide value. My 
>>>>> argument is that it's got flaws that are getting worse, and thus 
>>>>> should be recognized.
>>>>> What of examples like Enron where executives obfuscated the 
>>>>> records, made millions to billions, then screwed everyone else when 
>>>>> it collapsed? Or the CEOs who inflate the value, cash out in the 
>>>>> stock market, then leave before the company collapses into ruins in 
>>>>> a series of buyouts? In these cases the stock market and the 
>>>>> traders and the collective wisdom are easily fooled, and get fooled 
>>>>> over and over again, at least in the short run. But the way the 
>>>>> stock market works incentivizes these short term illusions because 
>>>>> it creates the ability to get really rich because of them. As 
>>>>> stocks trade faster and easier and information becomes more distant 
>>>>> from the traders this will become more prevalent, or so I believe.
>>>>> How do we fix that without removing the collective wisdom 
>>>>> evaluation of corporate strategies?   Though additionally I'll put 
>>>>> my faith in a handful of experts over the collective wisdom any 
>>>>> day. I think the collective wisdom lags and follows those who 
>>>>> really understand the companies and technology anyway.
>>>>> As far as short-selling companies who are pursuing the above 
>>>>> strategies, I think that is a good strategy, and I'm sure there are 
>>>>> some who do make a profit doing that... but it requires longer term 
>>>>> thinking and longer term strategies to do so, and the fact that 
>>>>> we're moving away that as a society means that such strategies 
>>>>> won't counterbalance the problem.   Though again the stock market 
>>>>> alone isn't the only cause of short term thinking. I just think 
>>>>> it's one piece of the issue, and perhaps one that could be adjusted 
>>>>> to help improve it.
>>>>> Dave
>>>>> On Aug 21, 2007, at 8:44 PM, Daniel Reeves wrote:
>>>>>> Not only do I disagree with Dave, I'll go so far as to claim he 
>>>>>> disagrees with his own position.  If not, Dave, why not make a 
>>>>>> killing shorting stock of the next company to do a round of 
>>>>>> layoffs for the sake of a short term boost in stock price?  The 
>>>>>> market is smarter than we think.
>>>>>> Nor do I have a beef with day traders.  Either they're providing 
>>>>>> valuable information to the market or they're going to get smacked 
>>>>>> hard.  (In expectation at least.)  In any case, they're paying a 
>>>>>> fair rate for the money they borrow and no matter how little time 
>>>>>> they own a stock they are, in aggregate, contributing to the 
>>>>>> investment in those companies. (And short-selling is just 
>>>>>> borrowing stock, later buying it to pay back the loan, so nothing 
>>>>>> slimy about that, contrary to popular conception.)
>>>>>> I used to be like Dave, pointing to a litany of "obvious" flaws in 
>>>>>> the market (stock market or "the market" more generally, like 
>>>>>> microsoft being sucky (for me) yet rich).  But the market had a 
>>>>>> habit of being smarter than me and I've learned some humility in 
>>>>>> this regard.
>>>>>> As for Dave's specific allegation (the stock market focuses on 
>>>>>> short term gains), I don't think that's true.  The stock price 
>>>>>> estimates (the per-share net present value of) the cumulative 
>>>>>> future cash flow of the company.  The stock market estimates that 
>>>>>> better than any other known mechanism.  It is of course prone to 
>>>>>> fits of hysteria but when it does it's taking a very *long term* 
>>>>>> (fantasy) view.
>>>>>> That said, there are cases where markets fail and that is in the 
>>>>>> face of externalities. A classic example of an externality is the 
>>>>>> Tragedy of the Commons in which a bunch of farmers ruin a common 
>>>>>> grazing field because no one person has incentive to ration their 
>>>>>> use of it if no one else is. It's analogous to traffic congestion 
>>>>>> which is one of several reasons we need higher taxes (gas, roads) 
>>>>>> on driving. [1]
>>>>>> The need to tax pollution is another classic example.
>>>>>> Eugene's Starving Artist is an interesting example of a possible 
>>>>>> market failure.	That might be explained in terms of externalities 
>>>>>> (positive this time) if the art was of a kind that couldn't be 
>>>>>> charged for by usage (public sculpture perhaps).  In other words, 
>>>>>> you have free-riders.
>>>>>> Eugene's Down On Their Luck example I believe is an argument for 
>>>>>> risk pooling, one form of which is the "social safety net", ie, 
>>>>>> welfare.  It seems that participation should be optional though.
>>>>>> Clare's Parasite CEO example I'm still thinking about...
>>>>>> Danny
>>>>>> [1] See:
>>>>>>
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/06/18/hurray-for-high-gas-p...
>>>>>> and add to the list that cars are dangerous to cyclists and skaters!
>>>>>> --- \/	FROM Dave Morris AT 07.08.20 15:21 (Yesterday)	 \/ ---
>>>>>>> I'll rephrase my claim:
>>>>>>> "Playing the stock market with the objective of short term gains 
>>>>>>> does not contribute to society, and in fact actively harms it."
>>>>>>> But I do think that is true. The stock market has some benefits, 
>>>>>>> and there are good reasons to have such a thing around, but ours 
>>>>>>> needs help.
>>>>>>> Stock prices can be a measurement of a companies performance, but 
>>>>>>> it can too easily be influenced in the short term for short term 
>>>>>>> reasons. I feel like it has become common for companies to trim 
>>>>>>> benefits packages, switch CEOs, cut R&D, and do other things 
>>>>>>> which provide a benefit the company for one quarter, and thus 
>>>>>>> make the stock market evaluation bounce when their profits look 
>>>>>>> good for a moment, but which have serious long term costs. The 
>>>>>>> CEOs in charge, and the investors, like this strategy because 
>>>>>>> they can profit from it, then get out before the stock goes down 
>>>>>>> again in the long run.
>>>>>>> Many people lose from this- not only those holding the stocks 
>>>>>>> when the company goes down in general, but the employees of the 
>>>>>>> company, and those using the services of the company. The stock 
>>>>>>> market encourages short term thinking for short term gain and our 
>>>>>>> country has become swept up in this. I personally know people who 
>>>>>>> have had their companies destroyed this way. I feel like people 
>>>>>>> invest not so much with an idea for building long term stability 
>>>>>>> and high probability of reasonable returns, but as more of a get 
>>>>>>> rich quick theme. And furthermore computer trading and other 
>>>>>>> features have made it easier to trade shorter and shorter term 
>>>>>>> with little understanding or analysis of the companies involved. 
>>>>>>> So stock values become influenced by more trivial surface things, 
>>>>>>> because that's all these day traders have time to see. So now 
>>>>>>> companies are making trivial surface changes to satisfy the whim 
>>>>>>> of short term investors, at long term cost.
>>>>>>> There was a big discussion on NPR about hedge funds, stock market 
>>>>>>> trading of mortgages, and how it led to the creation of, and 
>>>>>>> current bursting of, the housing market bubble. Part of the 
>>>>>>> problem was that stock market investing had become too 
>>>>>>> disassociated from the things being invested in and the real long 
>>>>>>> term values thereof.
>>>>>>> Meanwhile most people, who work for the companies thus traded, 
>>>>>>> suffer. Ironically it's their own investment in stock market 
>>>>>>> based IRAs that helps drive the process.
>>>>>>> So I would argue that the system needs to change. Not that we 
>>>>>>> need to get rid of the stock market entirely, but that we need to 
>>>>>>> shift the way it works to put the focus back on valuing companies 
>>>>>>> that have good long term strategies, and less on valuing get rich 
>>>>>>> quick schemes. What if you had to own a stock for at least a 
>>>>>>> month before you could resell it? Or a week? Or a year? I'm not 
>>>>>>> sure where the right number would be, but it really seems to me 
>>>>>>> that traders who sign on in the morning, borrow $10M from a bank, 
>>>>>>> trade all day back and forth, return the $10M at the end of the 
>>>>>>> day having made $100k, they aren't really helping society, and 
>>>>>>> could be actually harming it in some real and significant ways.
>>>>>>> Of course part of this also is changing the attitudes of people 
>>>>>>> and whether they should be looking to get rich quick at any 
>>>>>>> expense, or whether they should be looking to help themselves, 
>>>>>>> and incidentally also society, in the long run. But from a top 
>>>>>>> down approach at least we can put in mechanisms that are designed 
>>>>>>> to encourage the latter instead of the former. We can't force 
>>>>>>> anything, and I wouldn't want that level of government control, 
>>>>>>> but right now I feel like we strong encouragements to the 
>>>>>>> opposite of what we want.
>>>>>>> In the meantime I'll make sure that my company is never publicly 
>>>>>>> traded so I don't have to worry about it. :-)
>>>>>>> Dave
>>>>>>> On Aug 20, 2007, at 1:29 PM, Kevin Lochner wrote:
>>>>>>>> I have to take issue with Dave Morris re: "Playing the stock 
>>>>>>>> market does not contribute to society."
>>>>>>>> Not only does a company's stock price influence its access to 
>>>>>>>> capital, but the respective stock prices of all companies 
>>>>>>>> provide information about the state of the economy that a ceo or 
>>>>>>>> entrepeneur may use in making strategic corporate decisions.  
>>>>>>>> Stock prices are determined primarily by people who are "playing 
>>>>>>>> the stock market".
>>>>>>>> Investing in new companies does. It's a fine line, but
>>>>>>>>> I think we've gotten too much separation of rich and poor in 
>>>>>>>>> our society because of the way our stock market currently 
>>>>>>>>> operates, and that could use some correction.  I agree that 
>>>>>>>>> inheritance taxes are good as well, to help prevent too many 
>>>>>>>>> generations of people staying rich for free. But we should try 
>>>>>>>>> to reign in the various tricks which exist to leverage large 
>>>>>>>>> sums of cash into even larger sums via short term tricks in 
>>>>>>>>> business and stocks without actually contributing anything.	
>>>>>>>>> Not only do they take funds from people with less, they hurt 
>>>>>>>>> the country overall.
>>>>>>>>> But he is also correct- there's a wide variance of skill and 
>>>>>>>>> motivation in people, so there should be a wide variance in 
>>>>>>>>> income levels. I'd accept a factor of 100 variance from top to 
>>>>>>>>> bottom in salary as a reasonable maximum in relative value to 
>>>>>>>>> society that a person could be. Some people bust their asses 
>>>>>>>>> continuously to help the world. Some people actively try to 
>>>>>>>>> live off of others without contributing anything.    I do have 
>>>>>>>>> a problem with the factor of 1000 or 10000 variances that 
>>>>>>>>> sometimes occur, but those are obvious flaws that are difficult 
>>>>>>>>> to correct.
>>>>>>>>> Interesting to consider. :-)
>>>>>>>>> Dave
>>>>>>>>> On Aug 20, 2007, at 10:16 AM, Daniel Reeves wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> We've been debating this essay
>>>>>>>>>> http://www.paulgraham.com/gap.html
>>>>>>>>>> and I thought I'd move it to improvetheworld...
>>>>>>>>>> I'll start:	Graham is so right!  The income gap between the 
>>>>>>>>>> rich and the poor is wonderful!
>>>>>>>>>> Actually it started more as a debate about the nature of 
>>>>>>>>>> capitalism and interest ("why should money 'grow'?").  Here 
>>>>>>>>>> was the gist:
>>>>>>>>>> * [the economy] is a zero-sum game, isn't it?
>>>>>>>>>> - no
>>>>>>>>>> * those earning money are taking it away, even if only 
>>>>>>>>>> indirectly, from
>>>>>>>>>> other people, no?
>>>>>>>>>> - no, not if you think in terms of wealth (wealth = stuff you 
>>>>>>>>>> want,
>>>>>>>>>> money = way to transfer wealth)
>>>>>>>>>> * Or am I totally simplifying the haves vs. the have-nots with 
>>>>>>>>>> my pie
>>>>>>>>>> metaphor?
>>>>>>>>>> - yes, that's precisely the Daddy Model of Wealth!
>>>>>>>>>> * Is it THEORETICALLY possible for no one to owe any money at 
>>>>>>>>>> all in this
>>>>>>>>>> world, i.e., that everyone just has money that "grows"? Or 
>>>>>>>>>> does money
>>>>>>>>>> only grow if it is taken away from others?
>>>>>>>>>> - You're right, not possible, but for the opposite reason of 
>>>>>>>>>> what you seem
>>>>>>>>>> to be suggesting.  You grow money by giving it to someone 
>>>>>>>>>> (lending it),
>>>>>>>>>> not by taking it away.
>>>>>>>>>> It even got a bit heated, along the lines of "Trixie, I don't 
>>>>>>>>>> think it's right for you to lash out against 
>>>>>>>>>> capitalistic/yootlicious ideas without grokking the answers to 
>>>>>>>>>> your questions [above]".
>>>>>>>>>> Oh, and I offered a yootle to the first person who could 
>>>>>>>>>> answer the quasiphilosophical question why money *should* 
>>>>>>>>>> grow, with the hint that it has to do with human mortality.	I 
>>>>>>>>>> believe that's the only reason that holds in all circumstances.
>>>>>>>>>> In any case, Trixie wanted to resume the debate and this is 
>>>>>>>>>> clearly the place to do it!
>>>>>>>>>> DO NOT CHANGE THE SUBJECT LINE WHEN YOU REPLY (so it's easy 
>>>>>>>>>> for those not interested in this debate to delete the whole 
>>>>>>>>>> thread).
>>>>>>>>>> Ok, go!
>>>>>>>>>> Danny
>>>>>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>>>>>> http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/dreeves  - -  search://"Daniel 
>>>>>>>>>> Reeves"
>>>>>>>>>> "Everything that can be invented has been invented."
>>>>>>>>>> -- Charles H. Duell, Commissioner, U.S. Office of Patents, 1899.
>>>>>>>>> Dave Morris
>>>>>>>>> cell: 734-476-8769
>>>>>>>>> http://www-personal.umich.edu/~thecat/
>>>>>>> Dave Morris
>>>>>>> cell: 734-476-8769
>>>>>>> http://www-personal.umich.edu/~thecat/
>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>> http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/dreeves	- -  search://"Daniel Reeves"
>>>>>> "Try identifying the problem and then solving it."
>>>>>> -- suggestion from Dilbert's boss
>>>>> Dave Morris
>>>>> cell: 734-476-8769
>>>>> http://www-personal.umich.edu/~thecat/
>>>
>>> Dave Morris
>>> cell: 734-476-8769
>>> http://www-personal.umich.edu/~thecat/
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
> 
> Dave Morris
> cell: 734-476-8769
> http://www-personal.umich.edu/~thecat/
> 
>