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Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2006 18:09:21 -0400 (EDT)
To: improvetheworld &AElig umich.edu
From: James W Mickens <jmickens &AElig eecs.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: stupid feel-good "no liquids" rule
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> You are right to point out this inconsistency. However, consider the fact 
> that there is very little security on passenger train travel in the U.S. and 
> in most of Europe.

Yes, there are many threat vectors, but that doesn't mean that we should 
ignore safeguards against common methods of maliciousness. For example, 
most of us live in apartments or houses that have locks on the doors. 
These locks prevent the casual malcontent from entering through the door 
and doing evil things to our belongings. Unfortunately for us, locks can 
be picked by skilled criminals. Furthermore, with enough force, a door can 
be knocked down without the need to subvert the lock. Even worse, someone
could break in through the windows. And if that weren't enough, a 
particularly clever (and skinny) criminal could stealthily enter through 
the chimney, and so on and so forth. The outlook seems bleak for 
lock-based security. But despite the various ways in which door locks can 
be circumvented, it still makes sense to have them. They do offer some 
level of security. They are not useless. The same is true with airport 
security checks.


> I still don't know all the details of the latest attempted attack, but it 
> sounds like these attackers never even set foot in an airport. Their plan was 
> foiled long before that. Evidence recovered after the 9/11 attacks shows that 
> it also probably could have been avoided by similar means, i.e. by using 
> intelligence agencies, without inconveniencing travelers.

It is insufficient to just rely on intelligence agencies to stop terrorist 
threats before they emerge. We would never get rid of our door locks 
because we thought that the police could anticipate all burglaries and 
thwart them before they occurred. The locks are a backup. Similarly, the 
security checks at airports work in conjunction with the efforts of 
counterterrorism agencies. By themselves, these agencies do not provide 
all of the safeguards provided by on-site checks.

These checks can be burdensome to travelers, but we live in a dangerous 
world, and there would certainly be more danger and more terrorist attacks 
if we didn't have these checks in place. To abolish these checks would 
lead to tragedy and most Americans would be loathe to elect a leader who
pledged to do this. The fact that we could get through airport security 
faster would be a cold comfort to someone who gets blown up over the 
Atlantic.

Enumerating the morbid science fiction ways in which terrorists can strike 
us helps to motivate the need for addressing the root causes of terrorism. 
However, fixing these causes is a long term goal. It does *not* provide 
short-term security for present threats. If I told you that I was going to 
reduce crime in an unsafe neighborhood by bringing in more jobs and 
improving the schools, you would say that this is great. Unfortunately, 
the neighborhood would still be unsafe at the current moment. To say that 
a public policy would make things better in the future is not to say that 
it makes the present rosy. I'm glad that our airports are at least trying 
to ensure that I live to see that rosy future.

~j