X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,SPF_HELO_PASS autolearn=ham version=3.2.0-r372567 Sender: -2.6 (spamval) -- NONE Return-Path: Received: from newman.eecs.umich.edu (newman.eecs.umich.edu [141.213.4.11]) by boston.eecs.umich.edu (8.12.10/8.13.0) with ESMTP id k7EGHxnw024265 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL) for ; Mon, 14 Aug 2006 12:17:59 -0400 Received: from eyewitness.mr.itd.umich.edu (eyewitness.mr.itd.umich.edu [141.211.93.142]) by newman.eecs.umich.edu (8.13.6/8.13.6) with ESMTP id k7EGHu5t016058; Mon, 14 Aug 2006 12:17:56 -0400 Received: FROM edinburgh.eecs.umich.edu (edinburgh.eecs.umich.edu [141.213.4.27]) BY eyewitness.mr.itd.umich.edu ID 44E0A230.637C4.3986 ; 14 Aug 2006 12:17:52 -0400 Received: from edinburgh.eecs.umich.edu (localhost.eecs.umich.edu [127.0.0.1]) by edinburgh.eecs.umich.edu (8.13.1/8.12.9) with ESMTP id k7EGI05J020152 for ; Mon, 14 Aug 2006 12:18:00 -0400 Received: from localhost (jmickens Æ localhost) by edinburgh.eecs.umich.edu (8.13.1/8.13.1/Submit) with ESMTP id k7EGHw9o020147 for ; Mon, 14 Aug 2006 12:17:58 -0400 In-Reply-To: Message-ID: References: <44DF6DE6.1010203 Æ umich.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.2.0-r372567 (2006-01-26) on newman.eecs.umich.edu X-Virus-Scan: : UVSCAN at UoM/EECS Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2006 12:17:58 -0400 (EDT) To: improvetheworld Æ umich.edu From: James W Mickens Subject: Re: stupid feel-good "no liquids" rule Status: O X-Status: X-Keywords: X-UID: 680 > But that's the point that Nate and I and others are trying to make: the "no > liquids" rule constitutes spending millions on security that does just about > nothing to prevent attacks. These rules do little to improve safety if you assume that terrorist organizations are run by scientific masterminds who are capable of designing and implementing arbitrarily sophisticated attacks. Empirically speaking, this does not appear to be true. Most of the things that terrorists do are quite crude, e.g., strapping bombs to themselves, sneaking guns or knives onto planes, driving explosive-laden vehicles into buildings, leaving explosives in trash cans, etc. Straightforward countermeasures include chemical detection of explosives, behavioral profiling, X-rays, pat downs, putting concrete barriers around important buildings, and not placing trash cans in public places (as is the policy in the London Underground). To say that these measures do "just about nothing" for safety ascribes too much cleverness to the standard terrorist and ignores the common modes for terrorist attacks; if such an attitude were implemented as public policy, it would likely lead to an increase in terrorist attacks. It is correct that we cannot protect against arbitrarily Byzantine terrorist attacks, but such things are rare. If you look at Wikipedia's (by no means comprehensive) list of famous terrorist attacks: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_toll#Terrorism . . . it seems that the vast majority of attacks used the very simple mechanisms enumerated above. If we have such empirical data about how terrorist attacks are typically implemented, perhaps amplified by specific intelligence about impending attacks, we should definitely use this information to check for the most obvious things. I agree that the ban on liquids should not consist of security officers asking you to be earnest in answering the question "do you have any liquids?" However, reasonable implementations of policies like this will improve security because many terrorist attacks are simple and can be stopped by simple countermeasures. This is particularly true if the target is a place like an airport where entry and exit is tightly controlled. This is less true in places like a hotel or an open air market. ~j