AI Seminar
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    Tuesday, January 13th, 2004
    4:00 pm - 5:30 pm
    175 ATL (Large Conference Room)

    "Strategic Interactions in a Supply Chain Game"

    Michael Wellman
    Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
    University of Michigan




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The TAC supply-chain game presented automated trading agents with a
challenging strategic problem.  Embedded within a high-dimensional
stochastic environment was a pivotal strategic decision about initial
procurement of components.  Early evidence suggested that the entrant
field was headed toward a self-destructive, mutually unprofitable
equilibrium.  Our agent, Deep Maize, introduced a preemptive strategy
designed to neutralize aggressive procurement, perturbing the field
to a more profitable equilibrium.  It worked.  Not only did
preemption improve Deep Maize's profitability, it improved
profitability for the whole field.  Whereas it is perhaps
counterintuitive that actions designed to prevent others from
achieving their goals actually helps them, strategic analysis
employing an empirical game-theoretic methodology verifies and
provides insight about this outcome.

This represents joint work with the entire Michigan TAC Team.